SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR'S POSITION ON
DISCRIMINATION
STEPHEN E. GOTTLIEB*

This essay examines the underpinnings of Sandra Day
O'Connor's treatment of discrimination. This essay will briefly
explore her jurisprudence, her doctrinal approach, her understanding of
the racial world, and how her position has changed over time.1
Conclusions in a study like this are necessarily provisional, both
because there always remains the possibility that a better explanation
will appear, and because conclusions about people can always be
falsified by subjects like Justice O'Connor who are Still very much
alive and active.

I. O'CONNOR'S BASIC POSITION ON DISCRIMINATION

In Brown v. Board of Education2 and the many summary
determinations that followed, the Supreme Court overturned a list of
explicit distinctions between blacks and whites, directing blacks and
whites to different places and services, if indeed any services were
provided to blacks. 3 In the language we have subsequently applied to
those factual patterns, the discrimination was on the face of the rule; it
was de jure and explicit. O'Connor has not budged from that basic
understanding. The arguments among the justices in almost all of the
Supreme Court cases involving gender discrimination are about the
basic issue of facial, explicit and dejure distinctions, settled in Brown
with respect to race.4 For most of the life of the Rehnquist Court
* Professor, Albany Law School, Union University. LL.B., Yale Law School; B.A.
Princeton University. The author would like to thank the students in his U.S. Supreme Court
Watch class, Fall term 2004, on whom these ideas were first tested.
1. In some respects this essay updates the treatment of Justice O'Connor in STEPHEN E.
GOTTLIEB, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND LIBERTY IN AMERICA (2000). At

the same time, I have not tried in this essay to duplicate the much fuller treatment of some of
the issues that can be found in the book.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. These summary decisions are described in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 24345 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
4. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). O'Connor has joined opinions which some treat as involving
special treatment for women, notably Nev. Dep 't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
(sustaining the Family Medical Leave Act) and Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479
U.S. 272 (1987) (sustaining statutory pregnancy leave). The statutes were sustained, however,
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before the Grutter decision,5 affirmative action was condemned on the
same ground.6 In addition, many establishment, free exercise and
speech cases have been treated as raising essentially the same issue
that Brown settled in the racial context. In Washington v. Davis7 the
Supreme Court decided that where discrimination was not facial,
explicit and de jure, it would henceforth be defined by the intentions
of the governmental actor for the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause. Justice White, who wrote that decision, objected strenuously a
few years earlier to the Court's allowance of a municipal decision to
close a swimming pool in the face of an order to integrate precisely8
because the decision to close was motivated by racial animus.
Nevertheless, since the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, almost all
findings of intentional discrimination have involved determinations
that the discrimination targeted whites while favoring blacks.
For twenty years on the Court, Justice O'Connor almost never
found instances of racial discrimination against blacks unless the
distinction was part of the rule. The single exception was United
States v. Paradise.9 She pointed to the Paradisedecision in Adarand,
stating that, "every Justice of this Court agreed that the Alabama
Department of Public Safety's 'pervasive, systematic, and obstinate

on the ground that they prevented discrimination and based on a record which justified the
conclusion that the statutory requirements were appropriate responses to practices with roots
in explicit gender discrimination. Congress clearly concluded in the Pregnancy Disability Act
that the Supreme Court had been mistaken in treating denial of pregnancy leave as nondiscriminatory. At bottom the issue is the meaning of equality when men and women do not
share the same maladies - is it equal treatment to limit coverage to conditions which both
share or to specify conditions which are exclusively male or female? Or is a definition equal
which more broadly incorporates conditions which afflict men and those which afflict women
or both? The language of preferences assumes a baseline - if conditions men get is the
baseline, including pregnancy is preferential. But if the baseline is physical afflictions of the
body then excluding pregnancy would be unequal. See CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 222 (1989).
5. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); See also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). O'Connor did approve a "plus factor" in
Grutter and in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 656 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) where she accepted a voluntary affirmative action plan by a public employer with
sufficient disparities in its existing workforce that a prima facie case could likely be made
against it. Her carefully crafted opinions in Croson and Adarand appear to leave room for the
rectification of identifiable governmental discrimination that she sanctioned in the gender
context in Johnson, which in turn led to some of the dissents in Croson.
7. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
8. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 240 (White, J., dissenting).
9. 480 U.S. 149, 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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race-based
discriminatory conduct"' justified a narrowly tailored
0
remedy.'
a
providing
from
dissented
remedy," yet she
The Court, with O'Connor's participation, defines intentional
discrimination as "because of," not merely "in spite of," racial
effects." In practice, this mantra aims at conscious malevolence, and
excludes selective unconcern or difference in attitudes. As a result, in
numerous cases she and her colleagues miss obvious discrimination. 2
Once Congress clarified that the Court's treatment of intentional
discrimination was much narrower than the statutory definition,' 3 the
Court, with Justice O'Connor in the majority, used doctrines of
federalism to defang the statutory definition of discrimination that the
Justice O'Connor
Court's conservative justices did not like.
repeatedly writes about the use of strict scrutiny to smoke out
discrimination' 4 but the intent test lets her avoid doing so for black
10. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 237. See also Jed Rubenfeld, The AntiAntidiscriminationAgenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002) (arguing that the Court opposes efforts
against discrimination). See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, The High Court's Hidden Agenda, THE
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 16, 2001, at A21; GOTTLIEB, supra note 2 at 110-12. Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas have explicitly rejected the very concept of eliminating discrimination as
discriminatory, id. at 33.

11.

See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 353 (1993)

(O'Connor, J., dissenting):

Although we have determined that a successful constitutional challenge to
a regulation that disproportionately affects women must show that the
legislature "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group"
Pers. Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
Congress recently has made clear its position that showing subjective intent to
discriminate is not always necessary to prove statutory discrimination, see Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 105(a), Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074. The regulation in Pers
Administrator of Mass. to which Justice O'Connor referred overruled nine Supreme Court
decisions defining discrimination, see Joan Biskupic, Provisions: The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
CONG. QUARTERLY, Dec. 7, 1991, at 3620.
12. See, e.g., Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (approving
separate segregated recruitment and physical segregation of majority and minority workers in
Alaskan cannery); Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (approving dismissal of
bilingual Hispanic jurors on the ground that they would be able to understand the testimony
without the benefit of a translator).
13. See Joan Biskupic, Provisions: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, CONG. QUARTERLY,
Dec. 7, 1991, at 3620.
14. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) (plurality opinion):
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based
measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are
'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by
illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed,
the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means
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plaintiffs. It allows her to deny evidence of bad intentions or to credit
lame excuses that could not justify discrimination but allow her to
deny that the defendants harbored ill will.' 5 She readily finds
discrimination against whites from similar circumstantial evidence in
districting cases. In addition, O'Connor does not support effective
remedies. So-called affirmative action grew out of judicial frustration
with evasion of specific remedies. Judges started demanding to see
results. But Justice O'Connor rejected affirmative action consistently
over her lengthy service on the Court despite the fact that other
methods plainly did not work. 16 It is also instructive that the Court's
chosen 'fit' this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.
Id.
15. Lame excuses were credited in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)
(Hispanic jurors properly dismissed because they would be able to understand Spanishspeaking witnesses without translation); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 684-85
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accepting union economic explanation
for not taking grievances of black members); and generalized assurances accepted in Mu'Min
v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Court need not go
behind jurors' assurances of impartiality by questioning them individually).
Evidence of intentions was denied in: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) (segregated facilities insufficient evidence of discrimination); McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (evidence which showed racial disparities in capital punishment not
evidence of intentions); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (statistical
comparison of 3,500 to zero did not show prima facie case of racially discriminatory
intention). Justice Stevens' description of the evidence the Court did not credit in Armstrong is
revealing:
Also telling was the Government's response to respondents' evidentiary
showing. It submitted a list of more than 3,500 defendants who had been
charged with federal narcotics violations over the previous 3 years. It also
offered the names of 11 non-black defendants whom it had prosecuted for
crack offenses. All 11, however, were members of other racial or ethnic
minorities. See 48 F.3d 1508, 1511 (CA9 1995). The District Court was
authorized to draw adverse inferences from the Government's inability to
produce a single example of a white defendant, especially when the very
purpose of its exercise was to allay the Court's concerns about the
evidence of racially selective prosecutions. As another court has said:
"Statistics are not, of course, the whole answer, but nothing is as emphatic
as zero .... " See United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 852,
858 (CA5 1969) (per curiam).
Id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
Evidence was credited against but not for minorities in districting cases including Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 981 (1996) (districting not done to redress discrimination of black voters,
who had fewer representatives than their portion of the population, but to disadvantage white
voters, who already had more representation than their proportion of the population).
16. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225 (1995). But see Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) accepting a "plus
factor" in narrowly defined circumstances.
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17
largely at the civil rights laws.
lines of decisions in narrowing,
civil rights laws unconstitutional
towards the anti-discrimination

LIMITED CHANGE IN OPINIONS ON DISCRIMINATION

There have been several changes in O'Connor's handling of
the discrimination cases in the past few years. Justice O'Connor
joined a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy in Garrett, a case
involving the Americans with Disabilities Act, which suggested a dent
in the restriction of findings of discrimination to cases of conscious
malevolence and facial categorization. 19 Kennedy's opinion made the
point that insensitivity can be discriminatory. 20 They also made it
clear that they believed that discriminatory effects rules were aimed at
that kind of discrimination. O'Connor has condemned stereotypes in
gender cases like Mississippi University for Women but the
2 1 Nevertheless, in
discrimination at issue in those cases was facial.
Garrett, O'Connor and Kennedy concluded that the statute went
beyond the "the purposeful and intentional action required to make out
Equal Protection Clause" and agreed that it could not
a violation of the
22
apply to states.
In another decision, however, O'Connor did breach the
disparate impact barrier. In Tennessee v. Lane the steps in front of the
courthouse had a discriminatory effect on access to the courts for the
disabled, but no ruling or provision in state law explicitly excluded
them. 23 Nevertheless, O'Connor decided that states must make
courthouses accessible and that Congress had the power to require
17. On the use of federalism to limit the reach of the civil rights laws see Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
18.

See supra note 11.

19. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001). Garrett
held that the Eleventh Amendment bars state employees from recovering monetary damages if
a state violates Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
20. Id.

21.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,

458 U.S. 718 (1982).
22. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. ofAla., 531 U.S. at 375.
23. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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such action. 24 Unlike Lawrence,25. in which she avoided a due process
holding in favor of grounding her opinion on the Equal Protection
Clause, in Lane26 she avoided the Equal Protection Clause and
grounded her opinion on the Due Process Clause. In her conception of
federalism, Congress' power, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to restrict state behavior, is limited to what she and her
colleagues were willing to treat as a violation of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 7 She was willing to hold that states could
not impose barriers to the disabled in access to the courts because that
would violate their right to due process under Section 1.28 But making
that holding an aspect of the Equal Protection Clause would have
implied a much broader right against the states. Thus, the breach in
the wall barring disparate impact analysis in suits against states was
limited to those situations in which the Due Process Clause might be
implicated.
In another small breakthrough regarding proof of
discrimination, O'Connor had finally found on the facts that African
Americans may have been the victims of discrimination worthy of
some judicial relief.29 In Miller-El v. Cockrell,30 O'Connor joined the

opinion for the Court which held that lower courts did not give
sufficient weight to evidence of discrimination by a Texas prosecutor,
including an inference from statistical data. 31 After three prior
wrenching trips to the Court, O'Connor decided that one North
Carolina congressional districting plan does not discriminate against
whites.32 She had also pierced the affirmation action barrier.33
However, she was not convinced by the notion that minorities are still
subject to discrimination in this society. Instead she deferred to
employers she respected - large corporations and the military - who

told the Court that they needed minorities. 34 As a result, schools can
24. Id.
25. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 509.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29.

She would call it the first time since United States v. Paradise,see supra notes 11 &

12 and accompanying text.
30. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
31. Id. at 343.
32. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001):
33. Unlike Johnson v. Transp. Agency, the admission procedure at issue in Grutter did

not rest on an effort to remedy what might have constituted a prima facie case of
discrimination by the University of Michigan Law School.
34. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003). These benefits are not
theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
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(carefully) for diversity, though cities and the United States
now strive
35
cannot.

III. O'CONNOR'S JURISPRUDENTIAL TERRAIN

What accounts for her position on discrimination? Justice
O'Connor has joined the Court in rejecting the concept of moral
36
autonomy, as evidenced by Bowers v. Hardwick. Bowers rejected
the concept of individual moral autonomy where consenting adults are
not affected or harmed by the behavior. Justice Scalia later made the
point clear in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., writing "there is no basis
for thinking that our society has ever shared that Thoreauvian 'youmay-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else'38
beau idea-much less for thinking that it was written into the
Constitution." 39 That difference of views has obvious implications in
the privacy area. Moreover, rejection of moral autonomy also frees

today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief for 3M et al. as Amici Curiae 5; Brief
for General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae 3-4. What is more, high-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, "based on [their] decades of
experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's
ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security." Brief for Julius W. Becton,
Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae27. The primary sources for the Nation's officer corps are the service
academies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students
already admitted to participating colleges and universities. Id. at 5. At present, "the military
cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the
service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions
policies." Id. (emphasis in original). To fulfill its mission, the military "must be selective in
admissions for training and education for the officer corps, and it must train and educate a
highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps in a racially diverse setting." Id. at 29
(emphasis in original). We agree that "it requires only a small step from this analysis to
conclude that our country's other most selective institutions must remain both diverse and
selective." Id.
35. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
36. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
37. White's opinion was about deference to the legislature. That position does not do a
good job of explaining O'Connor's adherence to Bowers because of her consistently negative
position on democratic rights. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 2, at 30-31.
38. Justice Scalia did not make clear the point of his reference to Thoreau. He probably
intended a reference to HENRY DAVID THOREAU, ON CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849), or to HENRY
DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN; OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS (1854) both of which, in different ways,

describe the life of a man free of social conventions but most certainly doing no harm to
anyone else. For the philosophy behind the quotation, JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859)
is a good place to start.
39. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 574 (1991).
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Court conservatives to fill that gap with their own conceptions of
proper behavior, including their views on discrimination.
According to conservative views, the vice of discrimination
lies not in what happens to members of the group discriminated
against, but in the impure motives of those discriminating. 40 In other
words, they use the intent test to make most of the evidence irrelevant
- evidence of the distinctive patterns of majority and minority
outcomes, from which we would ordinarily infer intent. The question
of the purity of motives can be solved without looking at the
consequences, no matter how obvious. Their version of the intent test
then boils down to whether the defendant can articulate a ground of
decision that makes no mention of race. 41 Although more expansive
measures of intent have been repeatedly put forward by others, they
have been consistently rejected.42
Court conservatives advance
categorical moral views, regardless of who is hurt, and reject tests that
take account of consequences that Would smack of relativism or
situational ethics.
O'Connor has also joined the majority in rejecting the
avoidance of harm, a corollary of moral autonomy because harm
constrains the autonomy of others. The Court, however, rejected the
proposition that harm, not merely antipathy, justifies intervention in
the affairs of others and must be avoided. In Herrerav. Collins,43 the
Court denied that a convicted man on death row whose attorneys
found powerful evidence that he had not committed the crime for
which he was condemned to die had a right to any further process or
that the federal courts had discretion to provide it. Justice Blackmun,
in dissent, suggested that the Court should look at evidence acquired
after the conviction when it appears to a court that the defendant is
"probably innocent. 44 The majority rejected that position.45 Leonel
Herrera was executed soon after the Court's decision. 46

If it is

constitutionally permissible to execute someone who is probably
innocent, then avoiding harm has no significant place in the law. In
rejecting Blackmun's position, the Court was taking the position that
40.
41.

See GOTTLIEB, supra note 2.
See supra note 17.

42. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring);

Stephen E. Gottlieb, Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
33 WAYNE L. REv. 97 (1976).
43. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
44. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 442 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

45. Id. at 402-04.
46. Man in Case on Curbing New Evidence Is Executed, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 1993, at
A14.
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procedure mattered but innocence did not. In effect, the Court rejected
consequentialism, making the issue one of form and not substance. In
this conservative model, the rejection of consequential evidence is
overdetermined - it is irrelevant to intent and does not constitute a
moral standard.
In addition to joining the majority opinion, O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion. Clearly troubled, O'Connor began her concurring
opinion by stating: "I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal
principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the
Constitution. Regardless of the verbal formula employed . . . the
execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a
'
In framing the issue, she
constitutionally intolerable event. ' A
attempted to leave open the question "whether a fairly convicted and
therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet another
judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew, 10 years
after conviction, notwithstanding his failure to demonstrate that
constitutional error infected his trial."4 8 Yet, she concluded that:
Resolving the issue is neither necessary nor advisable in
this case. The question is a sensitive and, to say the
least, troubling one. It implicates not just the life of a
single individual, but also the State's powerful and
legitimate interest in punishing the guilty, and the
nature of state-federal relations.4
On the facts, O'Connor convinced herself that there was no
reasonable question about Herrera's guilt. That, in itself, was an
interesting conclusion given that Petitioner's brief provides a
frightening description of a legal circus in which colleagues of the
slain policemen sat on the jury, police were implicated in the drug
trade and the specific evidence counsel asked the Court to consider
included an eyewitness and a former judge who had once acted as the
killer's counsel. Certainly the dissenters' view of the facts was itself
well supported. Two years later, in Schiup v. Delo,50 O'Connor joined
Stevens' opinion that the federal court did have the discretion to look
at the evidence. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy

47.
48.
49.
50.

Herrera,506 U.S. at 420.
Id.
Id.
513 U.S. 298 (1995).
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and Thomas would have held that they did not.51 Procedure was all
that mattered for them, and without O'Connor's vote, they were much
more explicit.
Those cases suggest some hypotheses about the philosophical
limbo in which Justice O'Connor operates.
Her conservative
colleagues make decisions without examining the impact on people
outside the courtroom. O'Connor is torn, tempted to join them but
unable to settle on a categorical resolution. At times she finds it
difficult to believe that certain kinds of petitioners accurately allege
that something has gone wrong, but also difficult to turn her back once
she is convinced.
Herrera was about the harm principle.52 Lawrence is about
autonomy. 53 As noted above, one of the most fundamental facts about
the conservative block on this Court is that it is not willing to give
people the right to make their own moral decisions so long as others
are not hurt. They do not treat that idea as a legal principle and their
rejection of that idea colors almost every aspect of their work. 54 In
Lawrence v. Texas, 55 O'Connor voted to find the Texas statute making
sodomy a crime unconstitutional, and that also suggested change.
Homosexual relationships, along with other sexual practices are
among the most contentious moral issues of our time. Justice
O'Connor had previously joined the majority in Bowers v. Hardwick,56
which sustained a statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting
adults. The phrase "consenting adults" is the standard euphemism but
it should be distinguished from situations in which we reluctantly
consent to things we dislike and courts are asked to discern whether
the consent was really coercion. These adults, or many like them,
were no doubt eager, not merely consenting. In joining Bowers,
O'Connor helped to sustain a statute that denied homosexuals the
57
pleasure they sought.
In Romer v. Evans,58 however, O'Connor voted to overturn an
amendment to Colorado's constitution prohibiting any and all statutes
that would ban discrimination against homosexuals. One might read
the case as meaning that O'Connor had imbibed some libertarian
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
506 U.S. 390 (1993).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
See GOTrLIEB, supra note 2, esp. ch. 2.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Id.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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principles. 59 Or, one could read the case as meaning that she and
Justice Kennedy had decided on the ground that the statute did too
much damage to gays and lesbians - a kind of cruel and unusual
punishment although in due process garb - or that the statute
improperly punished people for their status rather than their
reasoning within the opinion to
There was sufficient
behavior.
61
theory.
support everyone's
Nevertheless, O'Connor parted company with Kennedy in
Lawrence.62 Kennedy, writing the majority opinion, suggested that the
men involved could live their own lives without any interference from
the state of Texas. 63 O'Connor also voted to overturn the law, but she
differed with Kennedy in a significant way.64 By taking the equal
protection route, O'Connor agreed that Texas could not ban the status,
and had to treat everyone the same with respect to their behavior; the
behavior was either a crime for all or for none. 65 That principle was
also one of the pillars of Romer v. Evans.66 Disagreeing with the
majority regarding due process, O'Connor's point was that Texas
everyone. 67
could ban the acts involved only so long as it did so for
68
She stood by her decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.
In effect, O'Connor has no generalizable libertarian instincts;
no generalizable view that people can make their own moral decisions
provided they do not hurt others. 69 What people have rights to do are
the things that O'Connor believes are the right things to do. Everyone
has a right to be like her. In that sense, she is much narrower than
Kennedy. She remains in a jurisprudential limbo between portions of
the Court with opposite positions on moral liberty and the injunction to
avoid harm. That ambivalence continues to be evident in her opinions
on racial discrimination which reflect tantalizingly small changes in
her position.

59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 2.

62.

539 U.S. at 567.

63. Id.
64. See id.

65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66.
67.
68.

517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).

69. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 2. The argument in that chapter is based on opinions
which O'Connor either wrote or joined.
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IV. A COGNITIVE EXPLANATION

Despite the fact that she and her conservative colleagues have
made common cause on almost all cases involving discrimination
against or affirmative action for the black community, her colleagues
have frequently distanced themselves from aspects of her opinions that
seemed too moderate, too willing to give ground, albeit in some future
case not before the Court. y° O'Connor does not share the visceral
racism of a Rehnquist. She does not share the sense of entitlement of a
Scalia. She does not share the need to reject every effort to redress
mistreatment that Thomas displays. And she is more comfortable with
remedial measures than Kennedy. O'Connor's positive relationships
with the black community off the Court do not translate to her
71
opinions.

Within her doctrinal approach she could notice intentions to
discriminate against minorities the way Justice White often did, but
she does not. Her opinions on matters of race make it clear that racism
is transparent to her; and she does not see it. 72 She joined Kennedy's
comment in a case involving the Americans with Disabilities Act that
it is unconscious prejudices rather than conscious malevolence that are
part of the problem.73 Yet, she has not found a way to extend that
insight to race. She simply does not notice intentional or unintentional
racism when it is practiced against blacks. We could detail her myopia
in the minutiae of individual cases but that would be tedious and
repetitious. In asking why, we can pose a hypothesis that may affect
many as well as Justice O'Connor. Why indeed does so much of white
society feel so disconnected from the black experience of
discrimination? There are common but false understandings of what
has happened in the past that make it easy to distance oneself from the
plight of black Americans.
For many people, it seems that blacks get what they ask for. If
there are problems, it seems up to blacks to surmount it. These critics
of the black community have no sense of multiple barriers that build
70. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (per O'Connor, J.); id.at 378
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 347 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
522 (1989); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id. at 520 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
71. See Charles Lane, Courting O'Connor,WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, at W10.
72. See supra note 17.
73. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374-75 (2001)
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
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on themselves until the resources to surmount them shrivel and
disappear. They have no sense of racism as a contemporary problem
because they do not see it. They are not around when discrimination
happens to black Americans and believe themselves to have had no
part in making life difficult for dark skinned Americans.
Yet the northern half of this country segregated itself by
official means after Brown was finally beginning to desegregate the
south. The Federal Highway Administration paved the roads to the
suburbs while the Federal Housing Administration redlined those
suburbs so that blacks could not buy into them, and redlined the inner
city areas they lived in so that black neighborhoods were doomed to
deteriorate.74 Urban renewal, which some of my black friends
properly called "Negro clearance, ' 5 destroyed living neighborhoods,
breaking down the institutional supports of the communities. Black
businesses had grown up in virtually every field before Brown,
paralleling the white economy. But urban renewal separated those
76
black businesses from their patrons, scattered by urban renewal.
Black churches were separated from their memberships, and families
separated from relatives. Indeed to put it simply, national policies
turned poor but functional and perfectly safe communities into the
desperate and dangerous ghettos we have come to fear and deplore.
So of course whites, who understand none of this, feel no benefits and
no obligation to share in the solution.
Would ubiquitous government complicity in the resegregation
of America have mattered to O'Connor even if she understood it?
None of that tracks O'Connor's doctrinal contributions, separating
societal discrimination from specific acts with identifiable causes and
identifiable effects that she demanded in Johnson,77 Croson,78 and
74. Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of American Apartheid: The Necessity and
Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integration, 81 IOWA L. REV. 479, 486 (1995);
CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 229-37
(1955); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED

STATES 203-15 (1985); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 54-55 (1993); MELVIN L. OLIVER &
THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL

See also NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN
INEQUALITY 17-18, 51-52, 150, 174 (1995).
PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 101 (1969).

75.

See Wendell E.Pritchett, The "Public Menace" ofBlight: Urban Renewal and the

PrivateUses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV., 1, 34-5 (2003) (describing the

concept of "Negro clearance").
76. See Thomas D. Boston, Trends in Minority-Owned Businesses, in 2 AMERICA
BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES at 190, 196-97 (2001).

77. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
78. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Adarand.79 However, it can affect our sense of the world in larger,
more diffuse ways: our confidence that blacks must be responsible for
their own misfortunes; our confidence that if the U.S. Attorney in
California prosecutes only blacks, that is because only blacks have
committed the crimes; our confidence that economic motives are
unrelated to race, or can be justified without a look at the racial
consequences; 81 our confidence that blacks are now represented 82 and
all the problems have been solved except those of their own making,
perhaps most important, our sense of our own lack of complicity in
and innocence of the contemporary plight of black Americans and our
confidence that their problems will not affect us - all that may have
been the perverse contribution of northern segregation.
Before Brown, blacks had made major strides up from slavery,
including the establishment of an extensive set of what are known as
Negro colleges, as well as contributions in science, history, literature
and the arts and major commercial enterprises. After Brown, blacks
were thrown into the white world and became more dependent on it for
jobs and opportunities as their own segregated institutions struggled to
survive in a vastly and suddenly changed world.
Myopia about these events characterizes O'Connor as well as
some of her colleagues. Scalia is an obvious example of someone who
feels no relationship to black deprivations. His family immigrated
early in the twentieth century, but he understood none of the vast
official forces that were changing the black communities around him;
allowing Italian families to start new lives and shake their participation
in the gang warfare and violence that has characterized most large
immigrant communities, while not allowing the blacks to do the same.
Although it is not clear that a better understanding of the real world
and its impact on black fortunes would have opened O'Connor's eyes,
she is different from Scalia. O'Connor's ears are somewhat open at
least to the leaders of the society at large even if she is hard to
convince.
She apparently responded to major corporations and
military officers telling the Court that they need to take affirmative
steps to integrate their institutions although she has failed to notice
discriminatory corporate practices. She asks few questions during oral

79. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
80. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
81. Ward's Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
82. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1011 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993) on electoral success.
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argument while listening intently but when she learns something, the
impact on her is often obvious.
One particularly interesting example was the argument in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,83 which included a length € exchange
What is
between Justice O'Connor and counsel for petitioners.
of
a
group
of
treatment
the
involving
exchange
dramatic about this
minority women, tested for drugs and arrested at the time of childbirth,
some still bleeding from the birth, was that Justice O'Connor was
searching for information that clearly mattered to her. She apparently
did not know the usual procedures or understand how the treatment of
these minority women differed from the treatment of non-minority
Provided with the
women, either at this or other hospitals.

83. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
84. Transcript of Oral Argument, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001)
(No. 99-936), 2000 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 56, October 4, 2000 at 7-9. (Note that the author was
present at oral argument and the identification of the exchange as involving O'Connor is based
on the author's own observation and is confirmed in the transcript by the Ms. Smith's response
to a subsequent question which refers back to the inquiry by Justice O'Connor):
QUESTION [O'Connor, J.]: Didn't they do it to everybody?
MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor. They didn't search everyone. They looked at a targeted list
that included discretionary elements such as inadequate [*8] prenatal care, and
criteria
of
there's evidence in the record that some people who had inadequate prenatal care were tested
and some people who had inadequate prenatal care weren't tested, precisely because the word
inadequate is so QUESTION: Is there not a routine urine specimen collected for someone in the hospital
and tests employed? I mean, that seems rather routine. Is that not done for pregnant women
entering a hospital MS. SMITH: NotQUESTION: -- in connection with a birth?
MS. SMITH: Not in -- not to be tested for drugs, Your Honor. If you mean just in general
are urine samples taken, at some point during the course of prenatal care, I believe they are,
but not -

QUESTION: Yes, and wouldn't that routinely show up something like this, or MS. SMITH: No.
QUESTION: -- do you have to apply special -

MS. SMITH: You have to look for it.
QUESTION: -- analysis?

MS. SMITH: You have to search for it, Your Honor, which is what they did here.
QUESTION: And is that not routine in today's world, where drug use is more common,
and the doctor might need to know what to look for with the child?
MS. SMITH: Absolutely not, Your Honor. It's a special test that would need to be run
[*9] on top of what's normally done and, in fact QUESTION: Could a doctor today, when he thinks -- he has a pregnant woman, and he
thinks the woman's taking drugs. Doctors won't look at the urine to see if she's taking drugs?
MS. SMITH: They might, Your Honor. I understood Justice O'Connor's question to be,
just as a routine matter is it always done?
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information, she joined Justice Stevens' majority opinion holding that
it was an illegal search.85
One example does not prove a point. Nevertheless, it seems
consistent with her incorporation of what she learned from the amicus
briefs by major corporations, deans and military officials in Grutter.
On crucial issues, she does not know or understand how the world
works.

V. CONCLUSION

All of this generates four conclusions. Doctrinally, O'Connor
has barely gotten past the questions of explicit, facial, de jure
discrimination of 1954. Philosophically, O'Connor tends to see moral
issues in absolute terms rather than viewing them by the harms they
produce.
Factually, she does not understand why issues of
discrimination are so intractable. But, she changes, slowly.

85.

532 U.S. 67 (2001).

